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The purpose of this paper is to report on the current state of economic evaluations for 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations affecting food and agricultural trade. The 
paper reviews current theoretical and econometric advances and limitations in modeling 
SPS regulations, particularly in dealing with biological and environmental uncertainty. By 
systematizing limitations of current approaches for evaluation, and comparing them with 
approaches used in the public health arena, the paper identifies problematic areas, and 





Food trade conveys the risk of introducing invasive species to areas previously free of 
them. Such risk has motivated the worldwide adoption of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
policies designed to impede unintentional negative consequences of transmissions.  A recent 
report by Pimentel et al. (2005) estimated there are about 50,000 invasive species in the United 
States, causing losses adding up to almost $120 billion per year. Although acknowledged as 
necessary, SPS regulations can also be established as disguised barriers to trade (e.g., Hillman, 
1978, 1991) with significant consequences for the ability of developing countries to participate 
in world markets. In the U.S., the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is 
the government agency in charge of protecting the country against the entry of exotic pests1 
while maintaining its goal of maximizing the economic benefits of trade.2 A crucial issue 
for food trade is the optimality of SPS regulations.  A food trade policy could be considered 
optimal when it maximizes the benefit of trade while minimizing the associated pest risk. 
To achieve this dual optimization goal, SPS regulations need to be enacted under sound 
pest risk and economic evaluations.  Failure to include the economic dimension into the 
design of SPS regulations may yield non-optimal policies (Orden, et al., 2001).   
Despite such recognition about the relevance of economic theory in devising 
optimal food trade policies, economic evaluations of SPS regulations have usually been 
considered unnecessary or limited in scope.  In the U.S., Executive Order 12866 aimed to 
increase the role of economic analysis in rulemaking, but only for regulations which may 
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.3 Further, most economic 
evaluations of SPS regulations fail to fully internalize the pest risk they are evaluating. 
There have been limited attempts to internalize pest risk into econometric models.  Orden 
and Romano (1996) were the first to model stochastic supply of a good with such  
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stochasticity determined by the estimated probability of pest infestation.  Unfortunately, 
these efforts have been either scarce, incomplete, or inconsistently applied.    
In the international arena, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has been 
publishing since 1995 the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) to 
guide the enactment of SPS regulations. In April 2004, FAO published ISPM No. 11: Pest 
risk analysis for quarantine pests,  including analysis of environmental risks and living 
modified organisms (FAO, 2004). Section 2.3.2 is devoted to the “Analysis of Economic 
Consequences.”   This document established broad guidelines for the economic evaluation 
of SPS regulations.  ISPM No. 11 signals the importance of taking all sources of risk into 
account in order to produce appropriate analyses. It also emphasizes the need to use 
appropriate discount rates to bring economic estimates to a present value.  Unfortunately, 
the document is somewhat vague and short, lacking detail and precisions, beginning with 
what do the document understands by “appropriate” (for instance, the document calls for 
the need to take time into account when performing economic evaluations of SPS 
regulations, but does not indicate what such a time frame should be.)  
Thus, despite some broad US and international policy guidance, the economics of 
proposed SPS regulations tend to be evaluated based on criteria that are vague or ill-
defined.  As a result, economic models for evaluating SPS regulations are built and applied 
with criteria that vary from case to case, in many instances depending on the evaluator’s 
technical preferences and beliefs.  There is no universally accepted economic standard 
against which the quality of SPS policies can be contrasted and evaluated.   By using the 
U.S. regulatory process as an example, the objectives of this paper are 1) to systematize the 
array of biological and technical problems associated with the economic evaluation of SPS 
regulations; and 2) to identify those areas for which research may yield immediate results.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes APHIS’ 
regulatory process.  Sources of risks are identified and regulatory constraints described.  
The next section reviews how current economic evaluations of SPS regulations deal with  
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such risks and constraints.  Limitations and failures in current approaches are described.  
The last section discusses the relevancy of current analytical limitations, while identifying 
areas with greater potential for immediate progress. 
  
APHIS Regulatory Process 
   
Figure 1 depicts a broadly defined schematic for consideration of a policy change to 
allow product entry from the perspective of the U.S. regulatory agency. APHIS has a legal 
mandate to protect U.S. agriculture and natural resources including prevention of invasive 
species infestation.4 The decision-making process starts with a request for regulatory 
change by a candidate exporter (top of Figure 1).  Regulatory agencies in the exporting 
country will normally submit their own Pest Risk Assessment [PRA] to support the 
application for policy change under consideration.  For APHIS, the PRA presented by its 
foreign counterpart conveys two sources of uncertainty.  On one hand, there is uncertainty 
related to the biology of the invasive species in their new environment (biological 
uncertainty).5  On the other hand, there is a uncertainty linked to the scientific capability of 
the candidate exporter and the level of trust and confidence achieved by inter-agency 
relationships (regulatory uncertainty) (Thornsbury and Romano, 2002).  As suggested by 
Thornsbury and Romano (2002), it is likely that the level of confidence/trust on the foreign 
agencies and their PRA would influence the design and implementation of SPS regulations 
by the domestic agency. For instance, there is some evidence suggesting that regulatory 
uncertainty might be in part responsible for the recent surge in multi-step SPS regulations 
such as a Systems Approach (SA),6 which has been linked to the enactment of the 
regionalization principle7 (Vo, T. Supervisory Economist, USDA APHIS. Personal 
communication, 2004.).  Because a typical SA-based SPS regulations has most of its 
multiple safety measures implemented in the foreign country before shipment, it could be 
argued that their enactment is influenced by regulatory uncertainty on the ability of the  
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foreign agency to enforce safety protocols for the movement of goods within their country.    
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, the concept of regulatory uncertainty has not been taken 
into consideration by economist in evaluating SA and other multi-step SPS regulations. 
APHIS’ initial assessment addresses what if anything, has changed to warrant 
consideration of a policy adjustment.  After initial consideration, there are two possible 
immediate outcomes for the request. APHIS may reject the importer’s petition for further 
consideration and keep the ban in place. Another possibility is for APHIS to consider 
product entry under a safety protocol. The continued process to implement this second 
alternative (the one relevant to this paper) is shown in detail in Figure 1.   At this stage it is 
customary for APHIS officials to evaluate foreign PRA results against the scientific 
literature.  Once the process of identification is complete, APHIS undertakes its own PRA. 
In principle, three distinct targets of invasion risk are investigated as part of the 
PRA: the risk to domestic production, the risk to natural ecosystems (environment), and the 
risk to public health.8 The risk to domestic production (e.g., the risk exotic pests may pose 
to domestic food) is the most common source of dispute among interest groups, and hence 
often the analytical focus. Many of these risks are complex in nature and therefore difficult 
to evaluate by economists. Exotic pests may pose a risk to one or more domestic products 
and enter the importing country through multiple pathways, each with different biological 
and market conditions. Some negative consequences from phytosanitary problems are 
realized not in biological destruction of the host, but in damage to the quality of product 
available for sale.  Figure 1 also acknowledges the possibility that the pest infestation may 
have an impact not only on supply, but also on demand. For instance, labeling and other 
additional information may create demand shifts attributable to SPS regulation that should 
be included in an assessment.  
Although less frequently debated in public, the other two sources of risk 
(environment and public health) should not be dismissed. As directed by the U.S. National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 USC, 4321-4347) the risk that exotic pests may impose to  
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the environment is never overlooked by APHIS. In some cases the environmental concern 
alone has motivated the enactment of regulations to stop the entry of foreign commodities. 
For instance, environmental concerns forced APHIS to ban the entry of Rhododdendrum 
sp. from The Netherlands in 1993 (this rule is currently under revision) (Romano and 
Orden, 1997; Romano, 1998)  
The potential risk invasive species may pose to human health may also be critical. 
In general, only extreme, controversial cases such as those involving arsenic in Chilean 
grapes or the Mad Cow disease controversies have explicitly included public health risk in 
economic analyses.   Economic consequences of both environmental and human health 
risks associated with food trade are very important and, if realized, may obscure the 
economic impact of any pest infestation on domestic production. Figure 1, for simplicity, 
presents in detail the alternatives for only the latter case.   
Figure 1 shows three factors with direct impact on the risk and uncertainty of pest 
invasion: spatial dispersion, mechanism of spread, and control methods. A critical 
consideration should be the spatial distribution of both the host target(s) and existing 
invasive species.  Among the common policy measures applied to reduce this source of risk 
is the imposition of designated ports of entry for the exporter, and regional restrictions on 
where imports can be shipped once they enter the country.   The efficacy of these 
restrictions is moderated in part by mechanisms of dispersion the invasive species may 
adopt. Invasive species with greater capacity for movement and dispersion pose a higher 
risk to domestic products against which more stringent policy restrictions may be enacted.  
The availability and efficacy of control mechanisms once a pest outbreak has occurred may 
also influence the design and adoption of the SPS regulation.   Ideally, any pest outbreak 
would able to be contained and its negative biological and economic impact would be 
considered negligible.  It could be argued that, under such ideal conditions, there would be 
no need for any SPS measure at all, since the cost of enacting and enforcing such 
regulations would be greater than the efficient and inexpensive measures of control.  On the  
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other hand, it might be possible that once a pest is established, no countermeasure is 
available or feasible. For these cases pest risk would be catastrophic to domestic 
production. In reality, most cases tend to fall between these extremes, allowing for 
measures of both pre- and post-infestation control to be implemented. Although largely 
overlooked in the past, economists have recently succeeded in capturing the impact of some 
of these measures in their evaluations (e.g., Cook and Fraser, 2002; Peterson et al., 2004; 
Knowler and Barbier, 2005). 
Unfortunately, pest dissemination, potential establishment, control, and/or 
eradication are all post-invasion concerns that are rarely included in economic evaluations. 
Most economic evaluations oversimplify these scenarios, ignore post-invasion 
development, and concentrate only on the risk of pest infestation. To some extent, this 
limited focus stems from the legal mandates directing policymakers to focus specifically on 
the entry of invasive species.9  
After taking into account all sources of risk and uncertainty (biological and 
regulatory uncertainty), APHIS draft a PRA.    It is usually here where economists enter the 
regulatory process.  Figure 1 list important attributes used by economists in their evaluation 
of SPS regulations: market conditions for the domestic crops under consideration and the 
legal framework associated to the pest risk.  These factors do not have a direct influence on 
reducing either biological risk or uncertainty; however, they are crucial to economic 
analysis and risk management.   For instance, the possibility of a compensatory scheme for 
affected producers or other interest groups may have important economic consequences for 
the involved parties and should be taken into account in economic evaluations.  Also, the 
legal environment in which the SPS regulation would operate influences the levels of risk 
and uncertainty that are acceptable for the regulators.  For instance, the WTO allows its 
members to define their own level of “tolerable” risk, but mandates consistency in 
application across SPS regulations. Unfortunately, the inclusion of all these factors in  
  8
economic analysis presents technical difficulties that have not been systematically 
addressed.     
Ideally, the outcome of the economic evaluations, together with comments received 
by biologists and interest parties on the proposed draft, should help produce a revised, 
improved PRA.   A final PRA is finally published and a risk management scheme is set in 
place. 
 
Technical issues in economic evaluation  
 
This section reviews issues raised in section 2.3.2 of FAO’s ISPM-11 (Analysis of 
economic consequences).10 Strengths and limitations are discussed. Suggestions for 
strengthening consistency are introduced.  
 
Analytical framework: domestic vs. international   
 
An initial analytical question regarding the evaluation of SPS regulations involves 
the scope for such evaluation.  A general framework to analyze impacts of non-tariff trade 
barriers among all trade partners was developed by Roberts et al. (1999).  The authors 
studied the impact of SPS regulations at the macro level, focusing on their impact on large 
and small producers, exporters, and importers.  A similar criterion was followed by the 
ISPM-11, which guides evaluators to study the impact of a SPS regulation on each 
vulnerable market.   
In the US, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 1992) mandates 
federal agencies to focus only on the domestic economy in conducting economic 
evaluations: “Analyses should focus on benefits and costs accruing to the citizens of the 
United States in determining net present value. Where programs or projects have effects 
outside the United States, these effects should be reported separately.”  For simplicity, the  
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rest of this paper follows the OMB directive and focus only to the economic impact of SPS 
regulations in the US. 
 
Analytical framework: industry vs. societal points of view   
 
Traditionally, economic evaluation of SPS regulations has focused only on potential 
negative impacts to domestic production from a pest infestation.  Consumer interests are 
only included as a potential negative reaction (i.e.: demand reduction) due to lower quality 
of product available for sale (domestic) or loss in third-country market share (international). 
The ISPM-11 calls attention to the potential gains from trade – in particular the gains to 
consumers from imported products – in the evaluation of quarantine laws.  Recent studies 
have provided estimates of these gains and shown that the benefits of trade may exceed 
expected costs due to pest risks in some cases but not always (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; 
Paaarlberg and Lee, 1998; James and Anderson, 1998; Ordenet al., 2001; Brown et al., 
2002;  Knowler and Barbier, 2005).  
Several other papers have examined conceptual and pragmatic dimensions of the 
relationship between risk evaluation and cost/benefit analysis of quarantine decisions 
(Roberts, 2000; Roberts 2001; Snape and Orden, 2001, Maskus and Wilson, 2001; Josling 
et al., 2003). Section 2.3.2.3 of the ISPM-11 suggests the application of partial equilibrium 
techniques to estimate the welfare impact of a SPS regulation. Welfare analyses as those 
suggested by the ISPM-11 have already been applied in some evaluations (e.g., Orden and 
Romano 1996; Glauber and Narrod 2001; Cook, 2001; Brown et al., 2002, Bakshi, 2003).   
The Pareto efficient criterion states that a public policy should be desirable as long as at 
least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off.    Unfortunately, this 
standard is rarely achieved in agricultural trade (as in most real-life situations).  Domestic  
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producers of the goods targeted by the SPS regulations would often be on the losing side of 
the policy if these goods are allowed to enter the country.   An alternative, more pragmatic 
approach is based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, in which a policy is defined as welfare-
improving if those who gain from the change could fully compensate the losers, with at 
least one winner still being better off.   Orden and Romano (1996) had indeed applied the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion to their evaluation of the entry of Mexican avocados into the US.    
However, it is important to remember that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is essentially a 
mechanism to test if the SPS policy will yield larger social benefits than social costs, for no 
actual compensatory scheme for the losers of the enacted policy is required.   Orden and 
Romano (1996) did not consider any compensation scheme in their evaluation of avocados 
imports.   However, the possibility of considering a compensatory scheme for affected 
producers or other interest groups may not be discarded (for instance, the ongoing 
controversy over compensation to Florida homeowners from mandatory destruction of 
backyard citrus trees to prevent the spread of citrus canker (Florida Department of 
Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Haire, 836 So. 2d 1040, 1060 (Fla.4th DCA 2003).)  
Despite the growing recognition on the need for economic models that consider the 
economic of the SPS regulations on all involved agents, the building of such 
comprehensive models has been hampered by incomplete information.  Missing 
information on the risk the invasive species poses to the environment and human health is 
present in many SPS regulations.  The ISPM-11 guidelines deal with this limitation for 
modeling building by bluntly ignoring it: “Environmental effects and consequences 
considered should result from effects on plants…. However, the regulation of plants solely 
on the basis of their effects on other organisms or systems (e.g. on human or animal health) 
is outside the scope of this standard (ISPM-11, page 22).”    This limitation is discussed in 
more detail later in this manuscript.   
 
Cost-benefit, cost-effective, or cost-utility analysis  
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 The literature of policy evaluation shows a fairly large number of methodologies 
designed to estimate the value of a regulation. Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness are the 
two most common. In comparing these methods, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB, 1992) suggests: “Benefit-cost analysis is recommended as the technique to use in a 
formal economic analysis of government programs or projects. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
is a less comprehensive technique, but it can be appropriate when the benefits from 
competing alternatives are the same or where a policy decision has been made that the 
benefits must be provided.”  In the public health arena, because costs are normally easier 
and less controversial to estimate than benefits, CEA is often the preferred mechanism of 
analysis (e.g., estimating the expected cost for implementing a vaccination program is 
easier/less controversial to obtain than an estimation of the value of saved human lives).   
The opposite seems to occur in most SPS regulations. In food and agricultural trade, 
benefits are typically easier to estimate than the expected costs. Trade benefits based on the 
expected price reduction due to the availability of imports are relatively easier/less 
controversial to estimate than the economic impact of an invasive species on a new 
environment. Thus, in comparison to the public health arena, the relative ease of estimating 
benefits for most SPS regulations makes their absence from economic evaluations the most 
common source of analytical bias (and a source for trade disputes).  
An exception to the relative easiness of estimating benefits in the agricultural trade 
arena constitutes those SPS regulations in which the invasive species not only poses a risk 
to domestic production, but also to human health or the environment (e.g., those related to 
Mad Cow disease).   For the evaluation of SPS cases like these, economists may take a look 
at approaches used in the public health arena, where the use of Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) 
has become a valuable analytical alternative.    CUA is used in the public health arena as an 
intermediate approach between CEA and CBA.  CUA aims to find the least costly approach 
to achieve a unity gain in quality-adjusted life expectancy.      
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Measuring costs and benefits  
 
 The OMB (1992) claims that the principle of willingness-to-pay (WTP) “provides 
an aggregate measure of what individuals are willing to forego to obtain a given benefit.”  
Market-based measures (e.g., prices) constitute ideal starting points for WTP estimations; 
however, for cases where prices are not available (e.g., human life, environment), economic 
analyses must resort on alternative approaches.11   These methods are not free of criticism. 
For instance, existence values estimated during the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince 
William Sound Alaska entailed value loss in the order of several billion dollars, which 
some analysts deemed unreasonably large (Carson et al, 1994). Although SPS cases like 
those are uncommon, controversies regarding the valuation methodology to be applied may 
arise and its implications should be considered.  
  
Risk and Uncertainty  
 
Until the late 1990s, economists evaluated SPS regulations by treating them as 
another fixed barrier to trade. Risk was either ignored in the earlier studies or allowed to 
enter the model as another static scenario in sensitivity analyses.  Romano and Orden 
(1996) and Paaarlberg and Lee (1998) were the first to internalize the risk of pest 
infestation. Glauber and Narrod (2001) extended the analysis to account for multiple-step 
policies. According to their notation, a stochastic measure of welfare is displayed in 
equation (1) 
 
(1)                             ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( Φ − Φ Φ − + Φ Φ = Φ C W p W p EW N D  
  
  13
Where WD is total welfare with a pest infestation, WN is total welfare with no infestation, 
EW is expected welfare under SPS policy Φgiven the probability of an outbreak ) (Φ p and 
the cost of implementing the policy ) (Φ C . Then, an optimal SPS policy 
* Φ can then be 
defined so that the marginal change in welfare that results from the optimal policy is equal 
to the cost of implementing the policy 
(2)                                   ] ) 1 ( [ ) (
' ' ' '
N D N D W p pW C W W p − + − = − . 
Typically, estimates of  ) (Φ p  are viewed as measures of the risk associated with 
SPS regulation. However, risk can be expressed in ways other than ) (Φ p . The way risk is 
expressed may affect the outcome of the analysis. For instance, in section 3.1., the ISPM-11 
allows for pest risk to be expressed indexed to estimated economic losses. Expressing risk 
in this way may tend to bias economic outcomes towards negative outcomes.   Consensus 
regarding the way risk is expressed in the evaluation of SPS regulations is needed. 
Knowledge about  ) (Φ p  in equation (1) is rarely perfect. Economists have coped 
with this limitation by applying sensitivity analysis to their estimations. Although a 
valuable and useful tool per se, sensitivity analysis does not internalize the uncertainty 
surrounding the pest risk estimates. Such a limitation is particularly relevant to SA and 
other multi-step SPS regulations which are designed to reduce not only the risk of a pest 
invasion, but also uncertainties surrounding the risk management policy.  
Recently, researchers have started to turn their attention to bioeconomic models as 
an attempt to improve the integration of biological risk and uncertainty into economic 
models (Finnoff et al., 2005).   Although the use of bioeconomic models is praised as a tool 
for achieving a comprehensive estimation of the feedback effects between human activity 
and natural resources (Holden et al., 2005), only Finnoff et al. (2005) have attempted this 
approach to the invasive species problem and a fully evaluation of this tool is needed.  
Geographic and time dimensions    
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Both geographic and time dimensions are rarely simultaneously incorporated into 
the economic evaluation of SPS regulations. The underlying assumption of most economic 
analyses is that infestations, when realized, occur instantly and spread everywhere. 
Recently, Peterson et al. (2004) attempted to circumvent these limitations by modeling a 
two-step invasion process in which the infestation is investigated in two different regions, 
under two different regulatory and market conditions. Although innovative in its joint 
inclusion of time and geography, Peterson et al.’s approach is still crude in its treatment of 
these variables.   
Working with SPS cattle regulations, Forsythe and others (OIE, 2000) proposed to 
further circumvent these limitations by modeling the evolution of a pest infestation as a 
Markov process that could take the annual evolution of both the probability of pest 
infestation and pest recovery into account.  Although promising, this approach has not been 
applied to the plant side of the field.   An important limitation for this approach is that the 
information needed to build the Markov models is often unavailable: regulatory focus on 
pest infestation has precluded APHIS to provide probabilities of pest recovery in most of 
pest risk assessments.  
Even if the elements for the Markov model (or any suitable other) were available for 
an economic evaluation of SPS regulations that takes both time and space into account, two 
important issues need to be considered: the time frame for the analysis and the discount 
rates to be applied.  Decision about these variables is never trivial.  Section 2.3.2.1 of 
ISPM-11 does indeed call attention to the need to consider dispersion and time, but does 
not specify how.   The outcome of economic evaluations of SPS regulations will potentially 
vary dramatically with the time frame on which the analysis is based and the discount rate 
applied.  Depending on the expected relative sequence of expenditures and benefits, the 
time frame chosen for an evaluation can have a strong influence on the outcome of the 
cost/benefit analysis. For instance, for cases where the negative consequences of a pest  
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infestation are realized only a few years after the invasion (e.g., recovery efforts could 
neutralize the earlier negative consequences only a few years after the invasion to allow the 
benefits of trade to materialize), a short time frame of analysis would likely render negative 
outcomes. The opposite may occur if extended time frames were applied to a situation like 
this.  Alternatively, there are some species where the risk of infestation increases as time 
goes by. For cases like these, a short time frame of analysis would yield outcomes more 
favorable than those in which a longer time frame is considered.  An extreme situation 
would occur when the pest risk is low but very extreme and catastrophic in its 
consequences once realized.  In this case an extended timeframe would always render 
negative consequences.  
What constitutes an appropriate time frame?   Although it is not the goal of this 
paper to develop such a standard but to identify and emphasize its relevance to consistent 
policy development, we argue that the impact of such a time frame can not be ignored in 
the economic evaluation of SPS regulations. Inconsistencies across evaluations render bias. 
Therefore, consistency should be achieved within the analysis (i.e., both costs and benefits 
should be estimated across the same time frame) and between analyses. 
Time frame decisions are intrinsically linked to decisions about discount rate. To be 
comparable, costs and benefits occurring at different times must be expressed in terms of 
dollars of a particular time. The OMB (1992) suggests: “The standard criterion for 
deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles is net 
present value -- the discounted monetized value of expected net benefits (i.e., benefits minus 
costs).”  Choice of discount rate can be crucial to the final outcome of the economic 
evaluation, particularly in situations where the expected impact of the policy is expected to 
occur long time after enacted (Revesz, 1999).   For instance, when the negative 
consequences of a pest infestation are realized long after the infestation occurs, an 
unrealistically high discount rate (i.e., unrealistically assumes people does not value the 
future as much as the present) would likely have a bias towards trade.     
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What constitutes an appropriate discount rate?   The answer to this question is not 
straightforward for social discount rates are not reflected by any market rate (Newell and 
Pizer 2004).   Defining an appropriate discount rate could become particularly controversial 
for SPS regulations with an impact which may last over many generations.  For SPS 
regulations like these, an intergenerational discount rate may be considered.  However, 
choosing such a rate is never straightforward either, since it involves assuming the 
preferences of future generations is known.   Revesz and  Stavinz (2004) systematized 
current approaches to intergenerational discounting in two conceptual categories: one 
which seeks to maximize the utilities of present and future generations based on a social 
welfare function  (e.g., Lind, 1995); and another based on the assumption that existing 
individuals take decisions after they internalize the welfare of future generations (e.g., 
Shefrin and Thaler 1988; Cropper et al, 1994; Rothenberg 1993; Schelling 1995). 
In 1992, the OMB provided some guidance by suggesting Federal Agencies to 
apply a real discount rate of 7% as a base line in their cost-benefit analyses (OMB, 1992).  
The OMB also suggested to use a larger discount rate to be applied in sensitivity analyses 
for policies whose “regulatory proposal whose main cost is to reduce business investment”   
In 2003, the OMB modified this directive to allow the use of a 3 percent (or lower) real 
discount rate for intergenerational analyses (OMB, 2003).   The 3% discount rate is more in 
agreement to which most economists believe discount rates for environmental evaluations 
such as SPS regulations should be (Revesz and Stavins, 2004).   A 3 % discount rate has 
also been suggested for economic analyses in the public health arena (Miller et al., 2000). 
Although it is overall accepted that the same discount rate should be applied to both 
benefits and costs (e.g., Revesz and Stavinz, 2004), there is evidence suggesting that 
individuals tend to apply a range of discount rates for cases differing in the magnitude of 
their expected impacts, for gains than for losses, and with the time span under consideration 
(e.g., Cropper et al., 1994; Cropper and Laibson 1999). Although some approaches to 
incorporate these changes into evaluation models have been attempted in the past (e.g.,  
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Ainslie 1991; Weitzman 1994, 1998), they have been criticized for implying inconsistent 
decisions over time (Revesz and Stavins, 2004).    
 
Missing information  
 
 Economic analyses should include all relevant costs and benefits. Incomplete 
information often makes such an ideal difficult to achieve. Lack of proper scientific 
knowledge regarding the behavior of an invasive species in a new location, on its 
interaction with the new plant, animal, and human environment is present in most SPS 
evaluations.   A recent review of 23 economic evaluations of pest invasions indicated a 
generalized failure by economists to address these shortcomings (Born et al., 2005).  Evans 
et al. (2002) invoked the “precautionary principle” and argued for a ban on trade for cases 
like these; however, for some cases, such a criterion may be unnecessarily stringent.12   
Under which conditions can economic evaluators consider a source of risk with 
incomplete information non-relevant and ignore it?  ISPM-11 does not provide guidance on 
this critical issue. The literature indicates several approaches are available. A “value of 
added information” approach estimates the advantages of acquiring the missing information 
(when such acquisition is technically feasible). As it was mentioned above, because APHIS 
is mandated to prevent the entry of invasive species, the agency does not routinely 
estimates biological consequences associated with eventual establishment of the invasive 
species. Therefore, although possible to obtain, probabilities of pest recovery required for 
some of the suggested methodologies (e.g., the use of Markov models) are rarely available 
to evaluators (or regulators). The “value of added information” approach is thus an 
important tool for regulators and evaluators to decide about obtaining missing (but possible 
to obtain) pieces of information.  
On the other hand, when fully acquiring missing information is not feasible, a series 
of risk-abatement measures (multi-step SPS regulations) can be applied to reduce the  
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uncertainties associated with missing information to a tolerable minimum. Many multi-step 
SPS regulations are indeed designed to abate regulatory uncertainty. However, application 
of multi-step SPS regulations poses additional challenges to economists and evaluators. 
First, the marginal contribution of each step to the overall pest-risk management also needs 
to be evaluated. In other words, economists should investigate not only the welfare impact 
of these policies as a whole, but also the marginal welfare impact associated with each 
individual step.  Second, for evaluators and decision-makers to determine the optimum 
number of steps necessary to reach a minimum level of uncertainty, they will need to define 
the level that is acceptable. Unfortunately, consensus about these issues has not been 
reached and does not seem probable in the near future.  Without a clear understanding of 
uncertainty reduction, nor the availability of an analytical standard for a minimum 
acceptable level of uncertainty, the consistent design of optimal multi-step SPS regulations 
will be difficult to achieve. Furthermore, like the WTO mandate for consistency in 
acceptable levels of pest risk, it would be desirable for regulatory agencies to display 
consistency regarding the targeted levels of uncertainty that systems approach and other 
multi-step SPS regulations aim to reach. Such double consistency would act as an 




The last decade has witnessed impressive progress in the way economic analyses 
have been accepted and applied to the evaluation of SPS regulations. Economic models of 
increasing complexity and accuracy have been proposed and applied to this end. Despite 
these encouraging efforts, there are still many technical difficulties that need to be 
addressed.  
As this paper reviewed, technical difficulties economists face are complex and 
difficult to solve.  Problems are further exacerbated by incomplete information.  Lack of  
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consistent biological information hampers economic model building efforts and increases 
the complexity of the problems to be solved. Economists and policymakers react to this 
complexity in different ways, with little or no consistency, creating analytical chaos. Efforts 
to bring order to this chaos had yielded the elaboration of some international standards 
although they are very vague and highly incomplete. This paper documents and 
systematizes the variety and complexity of those problems. We believe this is the first and 
needed step to break this vicious analytical circle. Although the complexity of the policy 
issues precludes the immediate development of comprehensive standards, identification and 
systematization of analytic issues allows us to suggest possible and feasible ways to 
proceed.  
We identify three areas we believe may have a more immediate impact on the 
quality of economic analyses related to trade in food products. The first area we identified 
as of large potential for immediate analytical progress is in the analysis of increasingly 
popular multi-step SPS regulations such as SA. This type of regulations is particularly 
difficult to analyze since they tend to be designed to reduce not only risk, but also 
uncertainty.  As we have already mentioned, the inclusion of uncertainty into economic 
models of SPS regulations presents technical problems of non-immediate solution.   
However, the economic evaluation of multi-step SPS regulations can be improved by 
estimating not only the overall impact of the norm, but also the marginal impact of each 
step. By also looking at the marginal value of each individual step, economists may help 
design better, closer to optimal multi-step SPS regulations.   
The second area we identified is related to the treatment of missing biological 
information. We identify two types of biological information that is not currently available: 
non-retrievable and retrievable. An example of what we call non-retrievable biological 
information constitutes the complex pest-environment interactions that entomologist, 
environmentalists, etc., cannot estimate with the level of accuracy economist would need 
for their models. Retrievable information on the other hand, is biological information  
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subject to collection but not collected by legal or bureaucratic constraints.  An example of 
retrievable biological information constitutes the collection of data reflecting the evolution 
of a pest invasion. Post-invasion measures such as probability of pest recovery are not the 
focus of APHIS and therefore are rarely available to economists and evaluators. By 
applying a value of missing information approach, economists may work with biologists 
and officials into developing a list of retrievable information that could be routinely 
produced and used to improve the quality of SPS evaluations..  
Third, analytical progress could be rapidly attained by increasing the consistency of 
economic analyses. Economists seem to have reached implicit consensus about the need to 
adopt a societal point of view in evaluating SPS regulations.  There are many other 
measures in which inconsistency is prevalent.  Defining an appropriate time frame and 
discount rate is of crucial importance to economic analyses, yet is still often overlooked. 
Although different interest groups would argue for measures more appropriate to reflect 
their points of view, however, consensus on these measures (or at least on an approach to 
defining them) would be achievable and its impact on the quality of economic evaluations 
substantial.   
The three areas we have discussed above appear to be feasible to develop and 
therefore, have the largest potential to achieve immediate analytical progress. A large array 
of analytical problems would still remain untapped. One set of problems which are 
extremely difficult to tackle is mainly biological: it involves the existence of non-
retrievable biological information. This type of limitation poses an enormous challenge to 
both biologists and economists who want to make decisions based on relevant, but missing, 
information.  It is not clear which is the optimal mechanism for economists to respond to 
this challenge.  A second group of problems which are difficult to solve are mainly 
economic in nature.  They include the valuation of non-market goods. Decisions made on 
how to estimate the value of environment or human life have proven controversial in the 
past.  Efforts in the public health arena to reach consensus on the way to estimate the value  
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of human life have yielded a working compromise which avoids the monetization of quality 
of life (i.e., the value of human life is based on the value of expected lifetime production). 
Such a compromise could be adopted for the evaluation of SPS regulations with an 
expected impact on public health.  Similarly, consensus on the methodology to be adopted 
for estimating the value of the environment may also be very difficult to reach.    
Reaching consensus regarding the economic evaluation of SPS regulations might be 
further compromised by existing differences in the technical capabilities of trading partners.  
The complexity and analytical requirements of some SPS regulations are often beyond the 
means of developing countries (Wiig and Kolstad, 1992).   Hopes for more transparent and 
consistent evaluations of SPS regulations across nations may require developed countries to 
provide technical assistance to developing countries (Wiig and Kolstad, 2005).  However, 
for such assistance to become useful, it is necessary for developed countries to dramatically 




1 The Plant Protection Act of 2000 (7 U.S.C. § 7758) gives the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture authority to restrict importation from pest-infested localities 
2 Please see W. Ron DeHaven’s (APHIS Administrator) welcome at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/about/welcome.html 
3  U.S. Executive Order (EO) 12866 [58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993)] asks each 
federal agency to determine whether a regulatory action is "significant" and therefore 
subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Among other 
requirements, the EO defines "significant regulatory action" as one that is likely to result in 
a rule that may have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. 
4 APHIS works under authorities from 11 different statutes dating back as far as the Plant 
Quarantine Act of 1912.  
5 In this paper we define uncertainty as a lack of knowledge concerning the probability 
distribution of future events (pest infestation, pest recovery, etc.). 
6 
 The U.S. Plant Protection Act delineates a systems approach as “a defined set of 
phytosanitary procedures, at least two of which have an independent effect in mitigating 
pest risk associated with the movement of commodities” (USDA APHIS). Although other 
policy regimes may have multiple steps, a systems approach is defined specifically to 
include two or more requirements that independently reduce risk. 
7  Article 6 of the SPS Agreement (WTO) states that a country is required to allow imports 
from subnational regions abroad that are free or nearly free of pests or disease. 
8 FAO (2001) has identified the following six types of impacts an invasive species may 
cause: (1) production; (2) price and market effects; (3) trade; (4) food security and 
nutrition; (5) human health and the environment; and (6) financial costs impacts. For  
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simplicity and clarity, in this paper we collapsed these risks to the three mentioned in the 
text. 
9 
 U.S. statutes such as 7 CFR 319 and 7 CFR 360 focus on pest exclusion strategies. The 
Plant Protection Act (H.R.1504 and S.910) and Executive Order 13112 (1999) also focus 
on preventing the introduction of invasive species, but do emphasize the need for pest risk 
assessment in decision-making. 
10 The items discussed in this section do not follow the same order as they appear in the 
FAO document. The order has been re-arranged to facilitate the discussion presented here. 
11 ISPM-11 suggests the application of “use” and “non-use” methods for estimating 
environmental values. Use values are based on some element of the environment being 
consumed with price recorded. Non-use values include option value (value for a late use), 
existence value  (value associated with the environment’s existence), and bequest value 
(value associated to make it available for future generations). The sum of all these benefits 
(Use Value + Option Value + Bequest Value + Existence Value) equals Total Economic 
Value (TEV). The difference between TEV estimated before and after the SPS regulation 
would provide a measure of the impact of the SPS regulation on environment. 
12 As it reads in Evans et al. (2002): “The precautionary principle dictates that when the 
consequences of a rare event are large, the safest path should be taken and the risky 
activity should not be permitted at all as SPS measures are determined based on the view 
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Figure 1. Schematic For Consideration Of An Invasive Species Policy Change  
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